In retrospective, the geopolitical description of the Caspian Sea is rooted in the depth of thousand years. It vvas studied and described by scientists and travellers since antiquity. Some of them reckoned that the Caspian Sea had been connected vvith Black Sea. Other thought it as lake. The discussion on the status of the Caspian Sea started during the period vvhen the confrontation betvveen Russia and Persia, as vvell as, Russia and Great Britain for possession of the Caspian territories, vvas under vvay. A vievv, vvhich argued that the Caspian vvas a elosed sea, vvas the most popular in former Soviet legal science. It states that as the Caspian Sea is not linked to neither open sea nor ocean, it should, according to international lavv, be considered as a elosed sea. Hovvever, there vvas also an argument that even vvithout a link to ocean, Caspian Sea vvas a typical boundary lake situated betvveen tvvo states: the Soviet Union and Iran. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of three nevv states on the shores of the Caspian brought about fresh discussions on the legal status of the Caspian, as the nevvly-independent states argued for the delimitation of the Caspian on the national sectors basis. It seems that the exclusive control över Caspian Sea is a praclice of past and thus has became obsolete.
Introduction
Caspian Sea is one of the phenomenal water basins on our planet, its biological and mineral resources have served for the economic needs of people and states located on its coast since antiquity. The transport opportunities of the Caspian Sea, its unique tourist and resort centres, and mainly its oil and gas fields, reserves of which, in experts opinion, already exceed reserves of Persian Gulf, turned it into ultimate priority in foreign and internal policies of littoral states, especially of the Republic of Azerbaijan. These aspects explain the inereased attention accorded to it by the entire vvorld in the 1990s.
It is knovvn that before the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the Caspian Sea had been under shared authority of the USSR and Iran. Hovvever, in reality, only the Soviet Union effectively utilized the entire recourses of the Caspian Sea.
The post-Soviet period has created a nevv situation around the Caspian Sea, vvhich vvas caused by the fact that the number of independent littoral states inereased from tvvo to fıve (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Türkmenistan). Even during the Soviet Era, the Caspian Sea had a lot of political, environmental, hydrologic and other problems. Hovvever since 1991, these problems have become criıical because nevv littoral states did not only try to obtain more favourable terms of cooperation, befıtting to their ovvn interests, but they also tried to re-defıne the range of their rights and benefıts. During the process, hovvever, the Caspian states sink in mutual grievances and claims. The most dramatic reality is that they could not move tovvards real cooperation, benefıcial for ali sides, or solution of the problems of Caspian Basin vvithout the participation of ali the coastal states.
The problem of defıning of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea is the key problem, as solution of vvhich may affect further cooperation of the Caspian states in terms of skilful and rational utilisation of the region's resources. The number of those vvho vvere involved in discussion of the legal status for the Caspian has inereased after the breakdovvn of the USSR and the oil boom in the region. Hovvever, many studies, concluded since the end of the Cold War, have rather lookcd at the top of the iceberg, because the problems of the Caspian Sea, especially those relevant to its legal status, have rather complicated aspects in terms of theoretical and practical basis. It is possible, hovvever, to fınd a solution to the problem of the legal status of the Caspian by joining together the scientific and practical lcnovvledge.
History of the Caspian Sea as an issue of Interstate Legal Relations
In retrospective, the geopolitical dcscription of the Caspian Sea is rooted in the depth of thousand years. According to available vvritten sources, the Caspian Sea vvas studied and described by the scientists and travellcrs since antique times. Some of them reckoned that the Caspian Sea had been connected vvith the Black Sea. The legendary heroes of ancient Greek myths (Argonauts) had travelled from the Black to the Caspian Sea through Mannish Strait. According to studies pcrformcd by the scientists and geographers such as Hegatey Milctskiy, Herodotus, Aristotle, Erastofen and others, Caspian Sea vvas described as a elosed basin or as a bay of an ocean. Starbon deseribes it as a basin extended along a parallel of latitude from vvest to east. 1 In different times Caspian Sea had up to forty different names; they vvere given to the sea in accordance vvith either ethnic names of the people living on its coasts (present name of the sea vvas also given due to tribes of Caspian, vvho in the old days lived on the vvestern coast of the sea), or based on names of cities, provinces or countries locatcd in its littoral zone. Kazar (the Hazar Sea), 3 Darya-e Mazandaran (the Mazandaran Sea) or Darya-e Komal (North Sea), 4 thereby, taking into account coastal historical zones where ancient Iranian nationalities used to reşide, or assuming the geographical location of the sea vis-â-vis the country. 5 The propagation of islam and extension of the Arabian Caliphate to the region resulted in the fact that Caspian Sea and its inshore area attracted a special attention from the Arab conquerors and scientists, as well. Therefore, since the 8^-11 1,1 centuries, they called the sea alternatively as Khorezm, Djurdzhan, Tabaristan and Sea of Al Dailem. Such names as al-Bab va-l-Abvab (Derbent), al-Hazar, al-Hazariya and so on have also been used. 6 Development and seizure of the Caspian territories started long before Christianity appeared in Russia and islam did in the south of the Caspian Sea. Judging by available information, it is known that Abbasids vvho could not force out ovvners of the Zoroastrian principalities before the ll th century conquered the southern part of Caspian Sea in 760-761. Virtually, the Persian influence in Caspian Sea had not been subjccted to any changes up to 1722. The Safavids Dynasty (1501-1722) attached a great importance to the region, including Caspian Sea, and they successfully propagated Schism amid the population of the southern portion of the Caspian region, strengthening their povver.
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The merehant marine vvas actively developed in the Caspian during this period and later on the Genoese and then British trades people used it. 8 The Russians were also familiar with the Caspian Basin from ancient times. According to imam Abul-Hasan Ali-Masudi, famous historian of the East who lived and vvorked towards the end of the 9 th century, the first Russians came to the Caspian region approximately in 880 and soon conquered Abeskun Island. 9 The most famous Russian campaign around the Caspian Sea took place in 913 under the leadership of Grand Duke Igor when 50,000 of his soldiers on 500 ships advanced to Caspian Sea. The history knows one more Russian campaign to Caspian Sea with support of 72 ships. It occurred in 1175 not long before the Mongol-Tatar invasion of the regions adjacent to the Caspian Sea.
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After the invasions of the Mongol- Tatar conquerors in the  early 18 th century, which seized not only the Caspian states but also lower portion of Volga River, the Russian campaigns to the region stopped for a long lime. Only thrce centuries later, in the middle of the 16 th century after the merger of some Russian princedoms around the Moscovv State, the Russians again attempted to take the Volga and Caspian basins under their control.
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With the arrival of the Romanov dynasty to the povver in Russia and gradual centralisation of the regime around the Moscovv throne, the interest to Caspian Sea and territories adjacent to it started to grovv. Such scientists as Vixen Shiteryan (France) 12 and Roman Yakimchuk (Belgium) 13 note that the vvhole vvestem portion of the Caspian region, beginning from the Caucasian mountain ridge on the west to the mountain range of Elbrus in Iran on the east, became a zone of special attention to the Russians. Russia opened the way to this southern sea in 1554 when Ivan IV (Grozniy) first seized Kazan in 1552 and then in 1556 destroyed the Astrakhan Khanate and thus foreordained further territorial expansion to the Caspian basin.
The first Russian warship, named Orel, and meant for campaign in the Caspian Sea was built on November 14, 1667 by decree of Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.
14 The Cossack detachment °f Stepan Razin played the master in Caspian Sea in the 17 th century. Using the boats, they plundcred such Persian cities as Resht, Farakhabad, Astrabad, ete., situated on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. 15 In the spring of 1669, Razin's fleet battled near Svinnoy Island in the Caspian Sea (to the south of Baku) against the Persian fleet consisling of 70 ships, and defeated it, vvhich vvas regarded by historians as one of the biggest Russian victory in the Caspian Sea. 16 The predatory aggressions of Stepan Razin's Cossacks against the Caspian states and especially in 1668 against Mazardan vvas a signal of total occupation of the sea by Russia.
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At the beginning of the 18 th century, Caspian Sea vvas reconquered from Persians as a result of Peter I's Persian Campaign (1722-1723). For the period, the political and economic importance of the Caspian Sea vvas vvidely recognized: it vvas considered as an important strategic gatevvay to the countries of Middle Asia and India. 18 As Gul states, Peter I, having realised the existence of ancient Uzboy's river-bed, "planned to turn AmyDarya River to its previous direetion, and reckoned to obtain a vvater vvay dovvn to India". 19 The idea of setting up a navy in the Caspian Sea after Peter I's death vvas supportcd by Nadir Shah, an Iranian monarch vvho vvas originated from a Turkic tribe called Afshar. According to Dovlyatshahi, he vvas striving for dominance in the sea. With the assistance of a British enginccr, John Elton, a fevv vvarships vvere constructed, including the first batllc cruiser. Hovvever, unexpected death impeded his dream to come true. 22 In any case, Nadir Shah launched first vvarship on the Caspian in 1742. Hovvever, this step could not prevent Iran from loosing its control över the sea, and the Russians later destroyed the ship. 23 As a vvhole, the apogee of the struggle for influence and right of property in the Caspian Sea and Caspian territories also took place during the leadership of the Kadzhar dynasty In short, the international-legal status of the Caspian Sea started its formation in the period when the confrontation between Russia and Persia, as well as, Russia and Great Britain for possession of the Caspian territories, and Caspian Sea, was under way. Due to the fact that by the beginning of the 18 th century Russia and Iran have already became fırmly cstablished in the region, but Great Britain was just striving to get an access to the area through diplomacy, it should be acknowlcdged that the St. Petersburg (1723) and Resht (1732) Treaties laid the foundation for the future legal status of the Caspian Sea.
Contractııal Practice in the 17 th -19 th Centuries
The Resht Treaty of 1732 set the rights of the Russian property on some territories yieldcd by Persia, regulated the freedom of trade and navigation in the Caspian Sea, as well as Araks and Kura rivers. 31 The Treaty, as opposite to the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1723, slipulatcd only a fevv rights for Persia (the right of navigation), and bluntcd Pcrsians vigilance as it again lost control över a significant part of the southcrn Caucasus after almost a century of control. Russia also allovved Persia and its merchant marine to use the right to float in the Caspian Sea and moor to its ports. As to the navy, in the peacetime, as in the war, only Russian ships were allovved to float in the Caspian Sea. In other vvords, in accordance vvith the Treaty only vvarships of the Russian Empire could navigate vvithin the dcfıned area of vvater of the Caspian Sea. 34 However, the Russian politicians held another opinion. For instance, Barsegov reckons that the above-mentioned agreemcnts became an important "landmark in the history of establishing international-legal status for the Caspian Sea,... confirming the freedom of mercantile navigation and setting an exclusive right of Russia to have navy". 35 It is hard to dispute this conclusion, as its clear paradox.
The first scientific information containing comments of provisions of the Russian-Persian treaties dated 1813 and 1828, including those concerning the Caspian Sea, appeared by the end of the 19 th century. Fjodor Martens, famous Russian lawyer and diplomat, was one of those who first described the Caspian Sea from the international law point of view. In particular, he wrote:
As opposile to ihe opcn seas, the seas vvhich are not only surrounded by the territories of the same state, but also not linked to an ocean, should be considered from anolher standpoint. These are the enclosed seas: they are under control and aulhority of a state vvithin which they are siluated. On this basis ... Caspian Sea is also enclosed, although, it washes the coasts bclonging to Russia and Persia, however, it should be considered as a Russian sea. The 1921 Treaty has been mcntioned in articles and speeches many times since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the primary legal basis for dctermining the status of the Caspian. It vvas argued that the 1921 Treaty had defincd the foundation for foreign policy of nevvly establishcd Soviet State and Communist regime that came about as a result of the October revolution in 1917. On the other hand, the Treaty also defined nevv directions and orientations for Shah and the Islamic regimes in Iran in the 20 th century. Tehran, having agrced vvith unofficial Russian control över the Caspian Sea, has got a phantom right and guarantee of stable peace vvith Russia and assistance in case of third countries' aggressions against Iran. As the matter of fact, Iran consented to loose territory, possession and sphere of influence in return for a vvarranty of existence vvithin the borders and shape in vvhich it continued to exist throughout the 20 th century. Unfortunately, in the historical, political and legal literatüre, one can only find a superficial analysis and interpretation of the clauses of the Treaty of 1921. It seems that many scientists even do not realise that through this Treaty the Soviet state and Persia (officially namcd Iran after the 1930s) ignorcd the political and economic interests of third countries and agreed on sharing the sphere of influence, ineluding the Caspian basin. In fact, they established a elosed, inaccessible for others and colonial in content (Iran has voluntarily accepted the status of diseriminated party), status of the Caspian Sea. As a result, various legal institutions and politicians of the vvorld are stili today trying to unravel the set of contradictions set by the said Treaty. discovered oil near Baku. According to Yakemtchouk, this politically unstable basin was in the centre of the European attention at the time. In the early-1870s, Russia, which had inexhaustible recourses, stili depended on the West. That is why arrival of Nobel brothers, Rothschild and others as representatives of large-scale western capital to the Caspian region, in particular, to the Baku oil fields, vvas called for and supported by the tsarist Russia. The western businessmen could transport the Baku oil (at that time almost 50% of the world oil production) through various directions to Astrakhan, by constructed railroad from Baku to Tiflis-Poti, through port of Batumi to Svvitzerland (port of Sen Gotar), Genoa and to other largc Mcditcrrancan ports.
The First World War rcsulted in vveakening of the tsarist Russia and strengthcning of the role of the Western states on the outskirts of the empire and detenoted national liberation movements. 41 In such a situation on May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) declared indepcndence. As an independent country, Azerbaijan suited the West more than what it had been; a Russian border arca. 42 In turn, Russia tried to oust leading vvestern povvers and their companics from the Caspian oil patehes. When, in 1895, the largest of them (Standard Oil, Rothschild and Nobel Brothers Petroleum Production Co.) made an attempt to establish an association in order to obtain full control över the Baku oil fields, it vvas strongly counteractcd by Russia. It vvas the time that the first oil pipeline on the Baku to Batumi vvas laid. 43 At that time the government of the Democratic Azerbaijan actively supportcd this policy, relying on military support from the West. Hovvever, the vvestern allies passed Azerbaijan över due to either inability to agree vvith Russia or military-political problems and interests. In essence, the Wcst yielded Azerbaijan to the Soviet Russia.
This historical fact is referred by Barsegov, hovvever, from a position of proteeting the Russian interests. He argues that "vvhen defıning its relation to future status of the Caspian Sea, Russia should take into account the factor of political and military security". 48 In his opinion, presence of Russia in Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus has a great importance to obtain and retain status of Russia as great povver:
A front of military and political confrontation of the European great povvers that could be observed along Russia's vvestern borders at ali times spread [now] över [its] southern wing and covered Black Sea, Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus. Prcsenüy ongoing bypass of Russia by NATO from the southern vving -through Turkey and Azerbaijan-is a continuation of a historical gcopolilical tendeney. 49ibid.
The first conclusion he reaches is that during the both vvorld vvars and October 1917 Revolution, the vvestern countries used panTurkism in their quest to oust Russia from this region, and from the Caspian basin. Hovvever, in his opinion, the danger of severing Turkish-speaking regions from Russia has been neutralised. Then, one more deduction follovvs: "Present international-legal status of the Caspian Sea, excluding penetration of hostile states, provides security to both Caspian countries, the USSR and Iran from potential objects of aggressive pan-Turkism". 50 By summarising his considerations of the time, he vvould formulate the third conclusion: "Devclopmcnt in the Caspian region after the collapse of the USSR is very idenlical to the events that took place after the first cataclysm connccted vvith the October revolution in 1917 and collapse of the Russian empire". As it is knovvn, in April 1920, the ll th Red Army returned to Azerbaijan under the flag of Russia and started to move to consolidate the unity vvith Persia. The parties agreed that, under no pretence, there vvould be any foreigncrs in the Caspian basin and its surrounding territories. 55 The corresponding provisions of the Treaty of 1921 (No. 6 and 7) altests this. In return for that, Iran obtained a guarantee that it vvould not be occupied by Russia. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. Before the Octobcr Rcvolution of 1917, the concession on fıshery vvas under the Russian control. 58 The Treaty of 1921 also ended this privilcge and gave cqual rights to Iran on active participation in fishing through additional agreements (clause 14).
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The Treaty paid a special attention to the navigation and problems of international security. With regard to navigation, clause 11 states that Persia vvas given right to have a fleet in Caspian Sea on the same basis as Russia had: "Both Negotiating Parties As to the problems of security provision for the Caspian states (Russia and Persia), corresponding instructions vvere incorporated into clauses 6 and 7. In particular, the 6 th clause states a right of Russia to sent troops to Persia in the event of other countries trying to turn the Persian territory into a base for crossing the border and taking the field against Russia. The 7 th clause develops an idea of not permitting other countries' entrance to the Caspian Sea. The statement reads: "If a crew of the Persian fleet ships contains citizens of other states vvho use their presence in the Persian fleet for dissociate purposes against Russia, the Russian Soviet Government has the right to demand from the Government of Persia to remove given dctrimental elements". Hovvever, the agreement did not contribute to development of the Caspian international-lcgal status in the long term, 63 and after expiration of the concession period in 1953, Iran did not vvish to extend its term, thus the agreement became legally invalid. 538. 61 Ibid. 62 Mamedov, Legal Regulation of Soviet-Iranian Relations, p. 40. 63 Ibid.
A mistaken opinion was formed during the Cold War among the foreign international lawyers that the international-legal status of the Caspian Sea had not been established by the negotiating practice of the Soviet period.
64 From our point of view, hovvever, an imperfect but precise status had been set by the negotiating practice of the Soviet era. For example, the contents of the first official notes, which were exchanged by the governments of the USSR and Persia about port of Pekhlevi (October 1, 1927), underlined that Caspian Sea vvas the Soviet-Iranian sea, 65 i.e. the parties considered it as a sea acceptable for both parties. Previously, the negotiating practice of the 19 th century had considered it only as the Russian sea. Hovvever, the agreements of 1921-1940 did not define a specific status for the Caspian Sea. On their basis, it vvas hard to judge by vvhat type of vvatcr basin did the parties agree; sea or lake? Virtually the parties have legally determined the closeness of this basin, but not its status. Nolhing is mentioned in the agreement on delimitation of its territorial vvatcrs and seabed. Moreover, it should be emphasiscd that, at that time, the negotiating practice of both parties did not set a task of cstablishing precise status for the Caspian. It scems more likely that the tvvo coastal states preferred to establish a sui generis (special status and regime adequate to their military and political doctrincs but not easily understood by third parties) status for the Caspian Sea.
International Legal Discussion about the Soviet-Iranian Practice vvith Respect to the Status of the Caspian Sea
The international agreements betvveen the Soviet Union and Iran, despite radical changes in circumstances and appearance of nevv political, economic and legal conditions, are stili being discusscd among the Commonvvcalth of Independent States (CIS), Iran and vvestern countrics in order to establish international-legal status of the Caspian Sea. Thus, scientific positions conceming the legal status of the Caspian according to practice of the Soviet Era should be discusscd properly. Confiicting positions can be grouped vvithin three groups. The first one refleets opinion of the scientists vvho think that the Caspian Sea in the Soviet period vvas considered as a elosed, but not loopcd (or semi looped) sea. 69 Logunov proposed similar contradictory judgemcnt in the same study. At the beginning, he states that the Caspian Sea is linked to ncither open seas nor ocean and thereforc, according to international lavv, it should be considered as a elosed sea. Hovvever, on the next page, he supports completely nevv and, as it seems, more correct conccpt, according to vvhich "even vvithout a link to occan, the Caspian Sea is a typical boundary lake situated betvveen the tvvo states; the Soviet Union and Iran". Caspian Sea, because they are not applied to the boundary lakes". But, eventually, the author comes to a quite contradictory conclusion that the "Caspian Sea is the Soviet-Iranian sea".
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Within the same direction, Boytsov, too, acknovvledged the fact that the Caspian Sea, though it vvas a closed sea-lake, should be considered as the Soviet-Iranian Sea in accordance vvith the concluded agreements. He goes even further to state a more concreate judgement: "Caspian Sea has a closed (from legal point of view) intercontinental sea status set by littoral states and acknowledged by the international community".
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Similar vievvs, that recognizes the Caspian Sea as a closed Soviet-Iranian sea, can also be found in a number of studies by other, including foreign, scientists.76
As it has been noted earlier, the closed sea conception originates from the Middle Ages. its originator, John Selden, aimed to prepare the ground for the imperial claims of the Great Britain for vast open spaces of the world's seas. In the 19 th and 20 th centuries, this concept was put into practice by the Russian imperial policy, and then by its successor the Soviet Union. By advocating the idea of tuming the Caspian Sea into a closed sea, Russia and then the USSR emanated from not so much the geographical or scientific and legal factors, but it was rather an official military doctrine of a great power, vvhich did not wish to allow access into its vital zones of interest to outsiders. Particularly, they tried to close the region to the competition from the developed western countries, vvith vvhich it could not successfully compete in the Caspian Sea even as early as early 20 lh century. Then vvhy so many famous scientists, including those from Iran, in the period under consideration supported that mistaken position? There can be number of explanations.
First of ali, ambiguous position and deductions of the geographical science, vvhich vvere based on not only present situation of the lake, but also on conception inherited from the depth of centuries, rcsulted in above said position. Gul has neatly characterised their essencc: "Caspian Sea is the greatest lake in the 75 Ibid" pp. 145-184.
world. Thanks to the [its] size and vvater salinity degree it had been named as sea in the ancient periods".
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Such an approach to the assessment of the geographical situation of the Caspian Sea is not the only one. Afshin Danekar (Iran) also underlines this mistaken geographical feature.
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According to evidence of Nguyen Ngok Meen, it had been used to adduce the opinion on a necessity of considering large lakes as seas. This point of view vvas rcflcctcd in a decision of the US Supreme Court pronounccd in 1893 vvith respect to "US vs. Rodgers" case. security provision for the USSR, including, maritime security". 81 It is clear that these statements have a direct relation to the facts and reasoning of considering the Caspian Sea as a closed sea by a group of scientists, including those from Iran. On the other hand, the idca of, at least, scientific recognition of the Caspian Sea as boundary or international lake appeared in the Soviet legal science during the 1980s. For instance, according to V. F. Misher, although Caspian Sea has historically been knovvn as a sea, from the gcographic point of vievv, it is nevertheless a usual boundary lake. Opposite to the Soviet approach, an opinion in favour of considering the Caspian Sea as a boundary lake appeared and prevailed in foreign legal literatüre earlicr, vvhich is also connected, vvith a certain political developments of the vvestern conception for the boundary lakes.
As early as the late 1960s, a famous British lavvyer W. Batler, vvrote that dcspite the fact that the Caspian Sea as a vvater basin vvas under the legal jurisdiclion of the Soviet Union, it vvas indeed the largest lake that vvas historically named sea. 88 A French scientist Francis de Herting, notes the same vievv: "Caspian Sea, like Aral Sea, in fact, big lakes vvhich are under the national jurisdictions. Due to the fact that the Caspian coasts belong to tvvo states, the Soviet Union and İran, its vvater is to be considered as boundary".
In the opinion of A. Dovlatshahi, an Iranian scientist, duality of criteria in defining status of the Caspian Sea goes back to prehistoric period when it had a natural link with Black Sea and Artic Ocean. "However, its present status allows us to consider it as not a sea but a lake that does not have any link through a channel with an ocean or sea", the author states. 90 Pondaven, too, in his book Boundary Lakes pays a special attention to the Caspian Sea. In his opinion, the Caspian Sea, in spite of its size, recourses and ancient history, neveriheless, from international law point of view, can be considered as one of the least regulated lakes. The main purpose of the Treaty of 1921, as it vvas fairly defined by V. H. Ghizzatov, vvas to counteract the British attempts to control shipping in the Caspian. 92 It is clear that, in the early 20 111 century, this Treaty set an alliance of tvvo neighbouring states, vvhich vvas aimed at suppressing endeavours of the vvestern countries and their trans-national corporations to exploit oil riches of the Caspian basin, particularly, of Baku city.
The Treaty hovvever, bypassed the main issue; determination of the Caspians status, and, in particular, problem of delimiting sovereignties in it. 93 In other vvords, the Treaty did not define legal boundaries of the littoral Caspian states.
As to the security provision in the Caspian Sea, one can see lack of corrcspondence betvveen the negotiating practice and real life in a clause that limit presence of third countries' citizens on ships in the Caspian. According to the logic of the 7 th clause of the agreement, presence of foreigners from third countries is not forbidden in case they are not engaged in hostile activity. Hovvever, as the matter of fact, the citizens from the third countries could not arrive to the Caspian basin before the perestroika.
In the judicial, political literatüre and journals, it is frequently noted that the Caspian states must adhere to the Treaty of 1921 and follovving agreements concluded on its basis until the determination of a nevv international-legal status. Hovvever, that position rcflects more the interests of the Russian and Iranian parties, 94 but does not mcct the requirements of other Caspian states and countries participating to the implcmentation of nevv Caspian projects.
The Treaty of 1921 did not define exactly the internationallegal status of the Caspian Sea. That is vvhy it is difficult to judge by the contcnt of the Treaty clauses the real status of the Caspian: no borders are providcd, there is no rcgulation on main navigation rivers and canals, shipping principle vvere not dcfined, fishery and other aspccts are described in a vcry poor manner. Although, there are fevv statements amid the clauses of the agreement, vvhich directly concern the Caspian Sea and actually attcmpt to lay the foundation of its international-legal status and regime for the Soviet period, it is hard to say, judging by the content of the agreement, hovv its authors had catcgoriscd the Caspian Sea; vvhether they considercd il as sea, lake or something else? Follovving agreements, in particular, of 1931, 1935 and 1940, also could not ansvver this question and fiil the legal gap. 
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Then why presently Iran ehanged its position and again heads for the agreement of 1921 in its regional policy, and therefore, impedes development of new status for the Caspian Sea? Unfortunately, Iranian apprehension is connected with Azerbaijan's independcnce and its indcpcndent foreign policy. An Iranian scientist, Kasem Maleki, in a veiled form, vvrote about and supponed the Russian position towards Azerbaijan. Hovvever, it is obvious that grovving influcncc of Azerbaijan in the region upsets not only Russia but also Iran that due to archaistic strategies forcedly support the agreement of 1921. In particular, Kasem Maleki v/rites: "Azerbaijan represcnts a big real and potential danger to the Russian national security interests in Caucasus. In spite of the fact that prcsent rulers of Azerbaijan tactically shovv their loyalty to Russia, their military and political strategy is focused to the West". And finally, Iran sees the majör danger in the fact that "Baku opencd gates for pcnelration of vvestern countries. The interests of the United States of America, Great Britain, Turkey and some other states vvill evenlually prevail in Azerbaijan".
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The political reasons in Russian and Iranian attempts to keep the treaties, vvhich evidently hinder rapprochement of the political interests and economic integration of ali Caspian countries, become clearer by the passage of the time. Today they are under difficult conditions and they are forced to build relations not on attempts of finding focal points of vievvs and developing common approaches to solve disputable issues, but on mutual claims, blames and designs.
Hovvever, one can observe a progress in establishment of a nevv international-legal status of the Caspian Sea despite of obvious disagreements. 100 It became especially visible after the conclusion 98 G. Chinashvili, "False Lighıing of Soviet-Iranian Relations" in 
